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Constraint Datalog holds an increasing role in Trust Management. We discuss
several Trust Management systems and give a description of the environment and
requirements for Trust Management. Constraint Datalog using addition constraints and
approximation theory provides an expressive semantic with which to describe security
policies for credentials, delegations and authorizations. Approximation theory allows
halting in Constraint Datalog over addition constraints. We use the decision problem
of Diophantine equations to show that Constraint Datalog over addition constraints is
complete. Combining these two concepts provides an approximately complete, safe
language. The problem of constant additions to closed languages provides reasons for
using an approximately complete, safe language for Trust Management. Semantics for
the Role-based Trust Management framework (RT) are given in Constraint Datalog over
addition constraints including an alternate form of a threshold policy.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Trust Management is an approach to access control in decentralized, distributed systems
with access control decisions based on policy statements made by multiple principals
[13]. Decentralized means that an organization involved in Trust Management may
have several geographical locations where Trust Management will be required. The
fact that they are distributed means that Trust Management may span more than one
organization. If there is more than one organization, there will be multiple principals
providing authentication and authorization.
Much of the research in the area of Trust Management centers around policy
expressiveness. As the different frameworks evolved, different security policy situations
were suggested that were not expressible in the current languages. This lead to changes
or additions to the languages which were in turn updated in a cycle of more research.
One may argue that a complete language is not needed as security is certainly a finite
discipline with well-known and studied domains. However, computer science is a fast
changing field, and what may be adequate today will be obsolete tomorrow.
A Turing-complete language solves the problem of constantly adding capabilities
to existing languages but introduces a seemingly insurmountable problem. Namely,
in a complete language it is possible to specify a problem for which no answer can
be obtained. Since security applications must halt with meaningful results, by using a
Turing-complete language we overcome one issue only to face another. Of course that
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depends on what the phrase "meaningful results" means. A formal definition of what that
means is given in Chapter 3.
Security languages and problems associated with them have been the driving force
for the ideas presented in this thesis. We propose that a policy language specification
is a variation of the problem expressed by Hilbert in his 10th problem. Namely that
a policy language expresses a broad subclass of problems, which by Davis, Putnam,
Robinson and Matiyasevich’s work [15] is Turing-complete hence not decidable. We
recognize that halting is absolutely necessary in security applications and propose the use
of Datalog with addition constraints to provide proof-based semantics that are expressive
(Turing-complete) and by using approximation theory also ensure halting. This provides
a sound basis on which security and Trust Management may be built while allowing
extensible semantics that are both approximately complete and safe. The concept of
an approximately complete, safe language is very important and it is introduced in
Chapter 4.
Approximation theory plays an important part by allowing us to bound the results of
any query with only addition constraints. This is vital to ensure halting and we give the
theory and an example as part of the background on approximation.
The rest of this thesis is presented as follows. Chapter 2 presents some background
information and history of Trust Management. In Chapter 3 we discuss the theory of
approximation and give an example. In Chapter 4 we show that Constraint Datalog
over addition constraints is Turing-complete and define the concept of an approximately
complete, safe language. Chapter 5 examines the Role-based Trust Management (RT)
family of languages and gives a translation to Datalog with constraints. In addition in
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Chapter 6 we analyze the complexity differences between RT statements and rules in
Datalog with constraints. This is followed in Chapter 7 by conclusions and future work.
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Chapter 2: Trust Management
Several different language and framework designs have been proposed to solve the Trust
Management problem. Section 2.1 provides a background look at these languages in the
approximate order in which they were proposed. Section 2.2 looks at the environment
and its requirements. The world of computers and security is dynamic. It would be the
depths of naivety to assume that a system will not change enough to allow new security
situations not previously considered. It is important to have an extensible framework. A
Turing-complete language guarantees extensibility for future policy problems. Section
2.3 introduces the problem of using a Turing-complete language as a semantic basis
for a security framework. Figure 2.1 gives an graphic overview of the history of Trust
management.

2.1 Background of Trust Management
Certificates, reviewed in 2.1.1, form the basis for several Trust Management languages.
Research at AT&T lead to two Trust Management applications, PolicyMaker, reviewed
in 2.1.2, and KeyNote, reviewed in 2.1.3.

2.1.1 Certificates
The concepts of the public key/private key infrastructure are the basis for certificates.
Diffie and Hellman created public key cryptography in 1976 [4] and the RSA algorithm
was invented by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in 1977 [20]. Certificates became widely
used in the form of X.509 certificates for secure transactions across HTTP on the
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Figure 2.1: A brief history of Trust Management
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Internet. PGP certificates were also used for authentication of E-mail transactions.
Although X.509 certificates are hierarchical in nature and as such are not suited for Trust
Management, we will include a brief discussion here as an example of how certificates
are employed in the context of Trust Management. X.509 certificates contain several
basic elements as shown in Table 2.2.

Version Number
Serial number
Certificate holder’s distinguished name
Validity period
Certificate holder’s public key
Algorithm to use for communication
Certificate issuer’s name
Digital signature of the certificate authority
Figure 2.2: X.509 Fields

The version number indicates what version of the X.509 standard this certificate
complies with. The serial number is a unique number provided by the certificate authority
(CA) used to identify the certificate and to check revocation lists. The certificate holders
distinguished name is meant to be unique across the Internet and is usually associated
with a domain name. The validity period indicates when this certificate expires. The
certificate issuer’s name is the name of the CA that signed the certificate. These elements
are simple and have simple tasks.
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The certificate holder’s public key is part of an asymmetric public/private key pair.
They are asymmetric because information encrypted by a private key can only be
decrypted by the public key and vice versa. This allows secure communication from
anyone using the public key to the holder of the private key. The algorithm to use in
communication is the method the holder of this certificate is expecting when the public
key is used to encrypt communications. This is the basis for secure communication.
The digital signature guarantees that the CA has issued this certificate and that the
information contained in the certificate is valid. This concept is called non-repudiation,
which proves that the certificate in its current verified form came from the CA and can
be trusted. The digital signature is actually a one-way hash code of the certificate. Thus
you can check it against a calculated hash code of the certificate. If the two are the same,
you know that the certificate has not been tampered with and that if you use the public
key contained in the certificate to encrypt communications, then only the holder of the
private key can decrypt your communication.

2.1.2 PolicyMaker
PolicyMaker was the first Trust Management system [8]. It has policies and credentials
and allows any safe assertion language to be used. (An assertion language is a language
that allows the specification of a set of assertions.) An assertion has the form

source ASSERTS AuthorityStruct WHERE F ilter

Source is either a key or POLICY for local policies. Authoritystruct is the key of the
target of the assertion. Filters are just interpreted programs that determine if a string is
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accepted or rejected. The meaning of the assertion statement is that the source asserts
that the individuals identified in the AuthorityStruct have rights granted by the filter.
An application gives PolicyMaker a set of requested actions, policies and credentials
and PolicyMaker attempts to prove requested actions comply with the policies. The
major weakness of PolicyMaker is that much of the work in evaluating requests is left up
to the calling application. The filter language is not specified and the authentication of
certificates is not done by PolicyMaker.

2.1.3 KeyNote
KeyNote [1] overcomes some of the weaknesses of PolicyMaker and includes two
additional design goals: standardization and ease of integration. In KeyNote more is done
by the Trust Management engine than in the calling application. Signature verification
is done by KeyNote, and a specific assertion language is used. An Action Environment
in the form of attribute = value pairs provide KeyNote with the relevant information
about an application’s security requirements. Since KeyNote was built on PolicyMaker
technology, it retains the same design principles of assertions and queries.

2.1.4 REFEREE
REFEREE [2] which stands for Rule-controlled Environment For Evaluation of Rules
and Everything Else was also based on PolicyMaker. It was designed to work with
PICS a W3C standard for rating web pages. Like PolicyMaker it accepted information
including PICS certificates and returned a value indicating whether the information
and policies allow or deny access. Unlike PolicyMaker, REFEREE provides a third
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alternative called unknown stating that it could not determine whether access is allowed.
REFEREE appears to be unique in this respect. In a way it recognizes that not everything
is true or false, but some things are unknown.

2.1.5 TPL
Trust Policy Language (TPL) [11] was designed at IBM as a role-based solution to
e-commerce Trust Management problems. TPL uses X.509 v3 certificates, the TPL
language, and Java. The TPL language component is defined in XML. The important
difference between TPL and PolicyMaker is that it allows negative rules preventing
access. We note that DTPL (Definite Trust Policy Language) [9] does not allow negative
rules. The primitive structure for TPL is a group. The syntax in XML is different enough
from PolicyMaker to warrant an example. Consider the policy in Figure 2.3 which is
from [11].
The first group defined is the originating retailer self. The second group, partner
includes anyone with a partner certificate signed by self. The third group, departments
includes partner certificates signed by the partner group. The last group defines the
customers group to be anyone with an employee certificate signed by the departments
group. The function tag defines constraints using AND, OR, NOT, GT(>), and LT(<).
For example, the <FUNCTION> tag is a constraint where the rank field on a customer
certificate is greater than 3.
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POLICY
GROUP NAM E"self" /
GROUP NAM E"partners"
RULE
INCLUSION ID"partner" TYPE"partner" FROM "self" /
/RULE
/GROUP
GROUP NAM E"departments"
RULE
INCLUSION ID"partner" TYPE"partner" FROM "partners" /
/RULE
/GROUP
GROUP NAM E"customers"
RULE
INCLUSION ID"customer" TYPE"employee" FROM "departments" /
FUNCTION
GT
FIELD ID"customer" NAM E"rank" /
CONST3/CONST
/GT
/FUNCTION
/RULE
/GROUP
/POLICY

Figure 2.3: TPL Policy
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2.1.6 dRBAC
dRBAC (Distributed Role-based Access Control) [6] started as RBAC [21] in 1996 and
has expanded to be a fully distributed access control system. dRBAC concentrates on
highly dynamic coalition environments where the ability to adapt quickly, scale and find
credentials is needed. dRBAC distinguishes itself in the following three ways.
1.

Third-party delegation of roles from outside a domain’s name space rely on an
explicit delegation of assignment.

2.

Modulation of transferred permissions takes place using scalar value attributes
associated with roles.

3.

Continuous monitoring of trust managements over long-lived interactions is
implemented.
In item (2) above, scalar value attributes are similar to parameterized roles in RT and

allow dRBAC to include ancillary information about the authorization such as bandwidth
restrictions.

2.1.7 SPKI/SDSI
SPKI/SDSI [5] is defined in RFC2693. It uses a localized naming scheme and uses
public keys to identify principals and local identifiers. These name-definition certificates
came from SDSI. Authorization certificates came from SPKI. Globally unique names
require globally unique identifiers for the organizations. That is easily accomplished by
prepending a URI to the beginning of local names.
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Although SPKI/SDSI shares many goals with Trust Management systems, Li points
out in [12] that much of the processing of certificates to authorize requests is left to
application developers. Hence SPKI/SDSI falls short of the Trust Management ideal.

2.1.8 Role-based Trust Management (RT)
RT [14] is a complete Trust Management system that uses certificates for naming and
includes authorization on the certificates. Only certificates and requests are required for
RT to accept or reject a request. In Chapter 5 we discuss RT in more detail.

2.2 Requirements for Trust Management
For the purpose of fully understanding the requirements of an open, decentralized,
distributed environment, it is necessary to define what is meant by such an environment,
and then incorporate these characteristics into the expressive capabilities of the Trust
Management system.

2.2.1 Description of the Environment
The first qualifier open refers to the ability for anyone to be able to make a request for
access or service to a supplier of the same. For example, anyone who has a valid user
name with an Internet provider can type in the URL http://etrade.com and be connected
to the site. In this example, fewer services are available to non-members. In order to
make use of the main brokerage and banking services provided by e-trade, it is necessary
to provide your e-trade user ID and password. The fact that non-members can gain access
to the login page of the e-trade service makes it open.
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The second qualifier, decentralized, refers to the various resources being located in
physically separate locations. An example of this would be the Yahoo site, which is
physically located on many different servers across the world.
The third qualifier distributed refers to the situation where independent organizations
enter into coalitions to share resources. While sharing resources, each autonomous
member retains ultimate authority over the resources it controlled prior to entering the
coalition. A familiar example of this would be the ubiquitous ATM unit. These are
decentralized in that one bank owns many ATMs located in different areas. They are also
distributed in that authorization is granted to account holders from other banks as well as
to account holders from the bank that owns the ATM.
Combining all three of these descriptors results in multiple resources that are located
in multiple locations, independently controlled by multiple services and open for requests
by the public. In these situations, the owners and requester may be unknown to each
other. The Trust Management System needs to protect both the service providers and
the user of the service. The Trust Management system must cover a wide variety of
applications without requiring a custom package for each. The ability to incorporate a
large range of security situations within a single Trust Management system is referred to
as the expressiveness of the Trust Management system.
We will address the issue of expressiveness by first describing the expanding needs
of the open, decentralized, distributed environment and showing how existing Trust
Management systems begin to falter in function.
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2.2.2 Requirements of the Environment
X.509 certificates fill several requirements of a Trust Management system. Among
these are secure communication between organizations and users and provision for
authentication of both the requester and the service provider. Although X.509 certificates
provide a distributed users database, it does not provide distributed authentication of that
database because the ultimate authority is the root certificate authority. X.509 certificates
can not authorize access unless all you are interested in is authenticating the user.
Because most Trust Management systems use certificates in some form or another, the
emphasis on distributed authorization can be seen in the following Trust Management
requirements.
1.

An organization should have localized control of its resources. This entails granting
access and authority to parties known to the organization, e.g., owners, employees,
service personnel and contractors.

2.

An organization should be able to grant either full or partial access and delegate
authority to other members of a coalition to which it belongs.

3.

An organization should be able to have delegation of either full or partial access and
authority to the resources belonging to other members of a coalition to which it
belongs.

4.

The Trust Management system should be able to operate regardless of the security
domains in place among members of a coalition such as hierarchical or group based
domains. Domains also pertain to the way security is administrated at any location.
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For example, whether a user is provided with a USB key or must use a password
system, the Trust Management system should be able to operate as a back-end
system to the application or system needing to verify authorization.
5.

An organization should be able to enter into multiple coalitions independent of each
other but as interlaced as desired.

6.

An organization should be able to delegate, not only the authorization but also the
right to delegate authorization. We call this nested trust delegation.
Requirements (4) and (6) are open ended in a way that can cause expressiveness

problems for current languages. One could argue that policies will only cover a finite
definable area, and that languages can be extended on a case by case scenario, which
has been the approach in Trust Management to this point. Certainly in the majority of
systems we can cover the cases where security needs to be supplied. To avoid constantly
changing a language or adding to it, we could use a Turing-complete language.

2.3 Problems with a Complete Language
A Turing-complete language suffers from the halting problem [16], and in security it is
absolutely necessary to halt in a reasonable amount of time. If we approximate the results
of a query to ensure halting, then it must not allow access beyond what is intended.
Datalog, which is based on First-order Predicate Logic easily accomplishes halting
because it operates under a closed world assumption. Essentially a proof is constructed
from the data D using a query Q to satisfy a policy R. If `Q,D R, then we can answer
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yes to the access request. But Datalog is not complete. Constraint Datalog with addition
constraints also has a proof based semantic, and it is a complete language as is shown in
Chapter 4. Using approximation we can overcome the difficulties of halting in a complete
language.
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Chapter 3: Approximation
Approximation theory allows a query to be approximated over a finite domain. In
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 we give the theory of approximation. In Section 3.3 we present an
example based on Sierpinsky’s Carpet.

3.1 Approximation Theory
Unlike relational databases where each query operates under a closed world assumption,
Constraint Datalog allows recursion that may not terminate [17]. A good example of
a query that may not terminate is the following pair of rules that define the difference
relation D.

D (x, y, z) : − x − y ≤ 0, − x + y ≤ 0
z ≤ 0, − z ≤ 0
D (x, y, z) : − D (x0 , y, z 0 ) ,
x − x0 ≤ 1, − x + x0 ≤ −1,
z − z 0 ≤ 1, − z + z 0 ≤ −1,

(3.1)

Approximation allows us to halt with an approximation by bounding the result of
addition constraints. This limits us to addition constraints, but as we will see later this
does not reduce the expressiveness of Constraint Datalog. We define the following two
modifications to addition constraints taken from [18].

Definition 3.1

Modification 1: We change in the constraint tuple the value of any

bound b to be the min(b, u). Given a query Q, an input database D and an upper bound
u, the query using this modification will be denoted Q(D)u .
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Definition 3.2

Modification 2: We delete from each constraint tuple any constraint

with a bound that is greater than u. Given a query Q, an input database D and an upper
bound u, the query using this modification will be denoted Q(D)u .
Using these two modifications we can express the important result that we can bound the
least fixed point of a Constraint Datalog query.

Theorem 3.3

For any Datalog query Q, input database D, and constant u > 0, the

following is true.

Q (D)u ⊆ lfp(Q (D)) ⊆ Q (D)u

(3.2)

Further, Q (D)u and Q (D)u can be computed in finite time.
Proof

The Datalog bottom-up evaluation can be done followed by either modification

1, 2, or no modification if the constant bound b is less than u. If the rule is modified
by the first modification, the modified tuple implies the original one, or it implies an
unsatisfiable statement. If the result of the modification is false, then by definition it
is not part of Q (D)u . And so, by the definition of the least fixed point, all facts in
Q (D)u ⊆ lf p (Q (D)). If a rule is modified by the second modification, the result will
be a new fact of the same form except that it does not contain upper bounds. This allows
the addition of facts which need not be in lfp (Q (D)). However these new facts will
produce only facts that are subsumed by facts in Q (D)u . Thus for any number of rule
applications, the facts in Q (D)u are implied by previous facts obtained as part of the
lf p (Q (D)). Thus lfp (Q (D)) ⊆ Q (D)u .
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Since there is a finite number of different left-hand side atomic addition constraints
and since each rule application will change the bound a constant amount closer to the
lower bound, Q (D)u and Q (D)u will both be evaluated in finite time.

3.2 Defining Meaningful Results for Trust Management
Meaningful results for a Trust Management system is defined in terms of Theorem 3.3
using Modification 1. Namely the results of the approximation must contain only true
statements.

Definition 3.4

A result from a Trust Management system is considered meaningful

if it does not grant more privileges than have been granted by the principal responsible
for the resource being requested.

3.3 Fractal Example
Applying approximation to Fractals [7] is a natural problem. Fractals by nature show ever
more detail as we zoom in. In fact we can zoom in an infinite amount in a mathematical
model. When fractals are generated on screens or in print, they are approximations of
the mathematical definitions used to generate them. The most interesting property about
fractals is their repetition on a smaller and smaller scale.
Sierpinski’s carpet [7] is a special fractal that can be approximated by starting with
the smallest scale and building the fractal up to the limit of approximation. Consider the
Constraint Datalog program written for MLPQ [19] in Table 3.1.
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begin%Boxes%
Choice(m,n) :- m=0, n=0.
Choice(m,n) :- m=0, n=1.
Choice(m,n) :- m=0, n=2.
Choice(m,n) :- m=1, n=0.
Choice(m,n) :- m=1, n=2.
Choice(m,n) :- m=2, n=0.
Choice(m,n) :- m=2, n=1.
Choice(m,n) :- m=2, n=2.
D(x,y,z) :- x-y=0, z=0.
D(x,y,z) :- D(x1,y,z1), x-x1=1, z-z1=1.
M(x,y,z) :- x=0, y=0, z=0.
M(x,y,z) :- M(x1,y,z1), D(z,z1,y), x-x1=1.
M(x,y,z) :- M(x,y1,z1), D(z,z1,x), y-y1=1.
/* Creates the first set of base lines length=1,3,9...*/
BaseLine(x1,x2):- x1=0, x2=1.
BaseLine(a1,d3):- BaseLine(a1,d1), l=3, M(l,d1,d3).
Box(x,y,s) :- BaseLine(x,b), y-x=0, b-s=0.
Box(x,y,s) :- Box(a,b,l), k=3, M(k,s,l), Choice(m,n),
M(s,m,z1), D(x,a,z1),
M(s,n,z2), D(y,b,z2).
XBox(a1,c1,s) :- Box(a,c,l), k=3, M(k,s,l), D(a1,a,s),
D(c1,c,s).
fractal1(id,x,y) :- id=1, Box(a,b,l), x-a>=0, D(x1,l,a),
x-x1<=0, y-b>=0, D(y1,l,b), y-y1<=0.
fractal2(id,x,y) :- id=2, XBox(a,b,l), x-a>=0, D(x1,l,a),
x-x1<=0, y-b>=0, D(y1,l,b), y-y1<=0.
end%Boxes%

Table 3.1: MLPQ Fractal Program
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The Difference relation equation (3.1) is really the basis for approximation. We do
not allow the calculation of differences for some maximum bound in z. In Sierpinski’s
carpet the Multiplication relation M(x,y,z) is based on D(x,y,z). We use approximation
and M(x,y,z) to find the width and height of the biggest box in the BaseLine(x1,x2)
relation. Here we just find the largest power of 3 that approximation allows. Based on
these lengths we create the first set of boxes and use a recursive rule to create the bottom,
left point and width and height of each box. XBox(a1,c1,s) creates the interior boxes of
the fractal. Running the above program on MLPQ using an approximation value of 27,
we get Sierpinski’s carpet as shown in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: Sierpinski’s Carpet
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Chapter 4: Turing Completeness of
Constraint Datalog
Turing’s definition of an algorithm gives a basis on which other languages can be
judged. A language is Turing-complete if it can express everything that a Turing machine
can express. That is important because if a language is Turing-complete, then it can
express everything that a computer is capable of expressing. To show that a language
is Turing-complete it is necessary to define a reduction from a Turing Machine to the
language in question. Alternately, a Turing-complete language can be reduced to the
language in question. This second method is used to show that a Constraint Datalog is
Turing-complete using Diophantine equations.

4.1 Turing Machines
A Turing machine [10] is an abstract computer. It has memory in the form of a tape that
starts at the machine and has an infinite supply. That is unique because a Turing machine
will never run out of memory. The tape is divided into cells that contain symbols from a
finite set A = {α1 , α2 , ..., αw }. Different Turing machines may have different alphabets,
but all Turing Machines will have a special symbol ∗ to mark the start of the tape.
Turing Machines also contain a symbol Λ for an empty cell. The Turing machine has a
read/write head that reads and writes to a cell on the tape. In addition, the head can move
left or right across the tape.
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At any given time, the machine is in one of finitely many states that are denoted by
q1 , q2 , ..., qv . The action of the machine is totally determined by the current state and the
symbol scanned by the head. In a single step, the machine can change the symbol in the
current cell or move one cell to the right or left and change state. Given a state qi and a
symbol read from the tape αj the next state is defined as:

qi αj ⇒ αA(i,j) D (i, j) qQ(i,j)

(4.1)

where
• αA(i,j) is the symbol to be written
• D (i, j) represents the motion of the head such that D (i, j) ∈ {L, R, S} for left,
right and stay.
• qQ(i,j) is the new state.

4.2 Diophantine Equations are Turing-complete
Here we present the sequence of theorems and thoughts that lead Matiyasevich [15]
to answer that Hilbert’s 10th problem, that is, the decision problem for Diophantine
equations, is undecidable. The consequence of solving that major question has many
other applications and consequences. Specifically we see that Diophantine equations are
used to express listable sets (see Definition 4.3). That is, listable is a sufficient condition
for a set to be Diophantine. This remarkable result proves that Diophantine sets are
expressively equivalent to a Turing machine. We then show that Constraint Datalog
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over addition constraints is Turing-complete. We conclude that Constraint Datalog with
approximation over addition constraints is safe.
A Diophantine equation is an equation of the form
D (x1 , ..., xm ) = 0,

(4.2)

where D is a polynomial with only integer coefficients and integer variables.
It is important to note that this decision problem is equivalent to allowing only natural
numbers. Consider an equation of the form:
D (p1 − q1 , ..., pm − qm ) = 0

(4.3)

where pi , qi ∈ Z+ . It is easy to see that if we can find a solution to equation (4.3) then
we have found a solution to equation (4.2) by setting xi = pi − qi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. It
is equally true that if we have an equation of form in equation (4.2), then there exists
an equivalent equation with only natural number solutions. Therefore the decision
problem for Diophantine equations with integers is equivalent to the decision problem
for Diophantine equations with natural numbers.
Families of Diophantine equations are denoted by the existence of parameters
a1 , ..., an and have the form:
D (a1 , ..., an , x1 , ..., xm ) = 0.

(4.4)

We consider the set M of all n-tuples ha1 , ..., an i for which our parametric equation
has a solution, that is
ha1 , ...an i ∈ M ⇐⇒ ∃x1 ...xm {D (a1 , ..., an , x1 , ..., xm ) = 0}
Sets having such a representation are called Diophantine.

(4.5)

25
In studying Hilbert’s tenth problem it was natural to take an in-depth look at the
properties for these sets. What kind of sets can we find and how can we list them? One
important property is that Diophantine sets are listable.

Definition 4.1

[15] A set M is listable or effectively enumerable, if there exists an

algorithm which would print in some order, possibly with repetitions, all the elements of
the set M.
Martin Davis conjectured that Diophantine sets and listable sets coincide.

Conjecture 4.2

[15] A set S is Diophantine if and only if S is listable.

This implies that any set that is listable can be obtained from a single polynomial. Davis’s
conjecture also implied the existence of a Universal parameterized Diophantine equation
that for some parameters would produce any specific listable set. This is the result
that is most interesting to us. If Conjecture 4.2 is true, then Diophantine equations are
expressively equivalent to Turing machines, and there exists a universal parameterized
Diophantine equation that is expressively equivalent to a universal Turing machine.
Martin Davis made the first strides toward proving his conjecture. He showed the
following theorem.

Theorem 4.3

Every listable set M has a representation of the form

ha1 , ..., an i ∈ M ⇔ ∃z∀y ≤ z∃x1 ...xm {D (a1 , ..., an , x1 , ..., xm , y, z) = 0}

(4.6)

This became known as the Davis normal form. All that was left to do was remove the last
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universal qualifier. Davis, Putnam and Robinson obtained an exponential Diophantine
representation for every listable set in the following theorem.

Theorem 4.4

For every listable set M of n-tuples of non-negative integers there is

a representation of the following form
ha1 , ..., an i ∈ M ⇔ ∃x1 ...xm EL (a1 , ..., an , x1 , ..., xm ) = ER (a1 , ..., an , x1 , ...xm )
where EL and ER are exponential polynomials.
Thus we have a purely existential representation for all listable sets. But it is not
Diophantine, but rather it is exponentially Diophantine. One of the more interesting implications of Theorem 4.4 is that you can fix the number of unknowns for any arbitrary
exponential Diophantine equation to be as low as 3 unknowns.
Based on this work Julia Robinson found a condition sufficient for the existence of a
Diophantine representation.
There is a polynomial A (a, b, c, z1 , ..., zm ) such that
ab = c − ∃z1 ...zw {A (a, b, c, z1 , ..., zm ) = 0}

(4.7)

provided that there is an equation
J (u, v, y1 , ..., yw ) = 0

(4.8)

such that in every solution we have u < vv and for every k there is a solution such that
u > vk .
Now to prove Conjecture 4.2 it only remained to show that there exists a single
relation of exponential growth defined by a Diophantine equation. Yuri Matiyasevich
who finally proved this using the well known Fibonacci numbers. The relation between
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u and v in the Julia Robinson relation is
v = F2u

(4.9)

where F1 , F2 , ... is the well known Fibonacci sequence:
0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, ...

(4.10)

This proved Conjecture.4.2 resulting in the in the following theorem.

Theorem 4.5

[15] Every listable set M of n-tuples of non-negative integers has a

Diophantine representation, that is
ha1 , ..., an i ∈ M ⇔ ∃x1 ...xm {D (a1 , ..., an , x1 , ..., xm ) = 0}

(4.11)

for some polynomial with integer coefficients.
The definition of listable sets in Definition 4.3 and the results from Theorem 4.5 allows
us to conclude that Diophantine equations are Turing-complete.

4.3 Expressing Diophantine Equations in Constraint Datalog
Constraint Datalog over addition constraints with approximation provides the ability
to express Diophantine equations and to approximate the results. The interesting result
here is that one can approximate results to the same level that a computer is capable of
approximating results. Again here the limit is storage space. First we define a difference
relation and a multiplication relation in Table 4.1
Given any Diophantine equation of the form D (a1 , ..., an , x1 , ...xm ) with k terms we
collect the expressions in each term into a single variable Ti for 1 ≤ i ≤ k using the
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D(x,y,z)
D(x,y,z)
M(x,y,z)
M(x,y,z)
M(x,y,z)

:::::-

x-y=0, z=0.
D(x1,y,z1), x-x1=1, z-z1=1.
x=0, y=0, z=0.
M(x1,y,z1), D(z,z1,y), x-x1=1.
M(x,y1,z1), D(z,z1,x), y-y1=1.

Table 4.1: Difference and Multiplicaton Relations
multiplication relation. If we expand exponents to multiplication in each term, we write
the collection as follows.
Given a term with c constants and variables vl after the expansion we can collect
the constants and variables by writing a series of multiplication statements in Datalog.
Ti,1 = v1 v2 , Ti,2 = Ti,1 v3 , ..., Ti,c−1 = Ti,c−2 vc . In general we write
Ti,l = Ti,l−1 vl+1 for 2 ≤ l ≤ c − 1

(4.12)

Next we collect successive term variables Ti into expression variables Ej for
1 ≤ j ≤ k−1. We set E1 = T1 −(±T2 ) for the first expression and Ej = Ej−1 −(±Tj+1 ).
In Datalog we write this
D (Ej, Ej−1 , ±Tj+1 ) for 2 ≤ j ≤ k − 1

Example 4.6

(4.13)

Given the equation A (x, y, z) = 3xy 2 + 2z, solve A (x, y, z) = 0.

Using the Difference and Multiplication examples above we write
A (x, y, z) : − M (3, x, t11)
M (t11, y, t12)
M(t12, y, t13)
M (2, z, t21)
M (t21, −1, t22)
D (t13, t22, 0)
We illustrate the procedure in a parse tree as shown in Figure 4.1. The circles denote
either the Multiplication or Difference operations at each step.
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Figure 4.1: Parse Tree for Diophantine Equations

In this manner we can write any Diophantine equation in a finite number of steps
using approximation. The reduction from a Diophantine equation to Constraint Datalog
is linear in the number of multiplication, addition and subtraction operations. Therefore
we conclude that Constraint Datalog with addition constraints is Turing-complete.
Languages that are both complete and safe with approximation have real value in the
area of security and Trust Management. We propose the following definition.

Definition 4.7

The Semantics of a language that uses approximation to terminate

an evaluation of a program while retaining meaningful results over a definable finite
subdomain of the original domain of the program and is expressively Turing complete is
an approximately complete, safe language.
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Datalog over addition constraints with approximation is an approximately complete, safe
language.
From Theorem 4.5 we know that Datalog with addition constraints can express
any Diophantine set and thus is Turing complete. From Theorem 3.3 we know that
Datalog over addition constraints with approximation uses approximation to terminate an
evaluation of a program while maintaining meaningful results as defined in Definition
3.4. The difference relation equation (3.1) provides the definition of the subdomain
of integers. Therefore Datalog over addition constraints with approximation is an
approximately complete, safe language.
An approximately complete, safe language allows the language to perform a graceful
termination instead of a machine imposed termination due to the lack of memory. To
control termination requires either direct user specification or machine/operating system
cooperation with the language. This leads us to define one last definition.

Definition 4.8

An approximately complete, safe system exists if there exists

some set of parameters provided by the hardware, operating system or other source to
an approximately complete, safe language that allows the language to determine an
appropriate approximation threshold.
As a thought example we could ask an approximately complete, safe system to give us a
representation of π. The system would then determine, based on the hardware, operating
system and parameters such as time constraints, which are set by the operator, how many
digits it could calculate.
Definitions 4.7 and 4.8 will form the basis for future research.
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Chapter 5: Translating a Trust Management
Framework into Constraint Datalog

5.1 The RT Family of Trust Management
RT is a role-based trust-management family of languages part of which is based on
Datalog with constraints. The RT language includes principals and roles. A principal
may be a uniquely identified individual or process and may issue policy statements
and make requests. At any time RT is capable of determining which principal made a
particular statement or request. Roles are defined by a P rincipalName followed by a
RoleName. Roles act as a layer between principals and permissions and are similar to
groups. Given KA .R, we say that principal KA defines the role R. Each entity has the
authority to define a role and the members of that role. A role is defined by one or more
statements with the effect being the union of the groups defined. Before we give the
syntax and semantics of RT lets look at the types of delegation possible.
• RT0 supports localized authorities for roles, role hierarchies, delegation of
authority over roles, attribute based delegation of authority, and role intersections.
• RT1 adds parameterized roles to RT0
• RT2 adds logical objects to RT1
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• RT T provides manifold roles and role-product operators, which can express
threshold and separation-of-duty policies.
• RT D provides delegation of role activations, which can express selective use of
capacities and delegation of these capacities.

5.1.1 RT0 Syntax
Four different types of statements are necessary to define all the role types available in
RT0 .
Simple Member: This defines the principal KD to be a member of the role KA .R

KA .R ← KD

(5.1)

Simple Containment: This defines the role KA .R to contain every principal that is a
member of the role KB .R1 .
KA .R ← KB .R1

(5.2)

Linking Containment: This defines KA .R to contain all members of KB .R2 in which
KB is a member of KA .R1 .
KA .R ← KB .R1 .R2

(5.3)

Intersection Containment: This defines KA .R to contain the intersection of all the
roles KB1 .R1 ...KBk .Rk

KA .R ← KB1 .R1 ∩ ... ∩ KBk .Rk

(5.4)
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To complete the picture, the two types of statements below specify the syntax for
delegation. Delegations can be created by combinations of the previous four statements
but were added for clarity.
Simple Delegation: This means that KA delegates authority over R to KB . We can
optionally impose that KB can only authorize existing members of KC .R2 . If KC .R2
does not exist, the imposition does not apply.
KA .R ⇐ KB : KC .R2

(5.5)

LogKA .R ← KB .R ∩ KC .R2

(5.6)

This implies

Linking Delegation: This means that KA .R delegates authority over R to members
of KA .R2 . Optionally the delegation is restricted to members of KC .R2 .
KA .R ⇐ KA .R1 : KC .R2

(5.7)

KA .R ← KA .R1 .R ∩ KC .R2

(5.8)

This implies

5.1.2 RT1C Adding Parameterized Roles
RT1C also provides parameterized roles. Parameters are an extension of RT0 . The format
is similar to the statements in Section 5.1.1 with the exception that a role takes the form
r (p1 , ..., pn ), in which r is the role name and pj can take one of the following three forms.
name = c
name =?X [∈ S]
name ∈ S
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These respectively mean that a name equals to 1) a constant, 2) a variable with optional
requirement that it be in a set S, and 3) is in a set S.
The form of the parameters determines their function. Parameterized roles can
represent relationships between entities or represent access permissions that take
parameters identifying resources and access modes [4]. For instance,
Store.Employee(Manager = ”Steve”) ← ”Charlie”
states that Charlie is an employee and his manager is Steve. At some point Steve could
give Charlie a pay increase, because he is listed as Charlie’s manager. Another example
is:
W eb.perm(host ∈ descendant(’unl.edu’), port ∈ [0..1024]) ← ”Charlie”
Which shows how the element operator is used with two different types of constraint
domains. The expression means that Charlie is given access to any host in the unl.edu
domain on privileged ports. In this example host is in a tree domain, and port is in a
range domain.

5.1.3 RT2 Logical Objects
Logical objects are added in the guise of o-sets which perform similar duties to roles
except they do not contain principals, they apply to logical objects. This means that we
can group logical objects together with principals and permissions. An o-set id has a
specific type τ associated with it. The body of a o-set definition can have a value of base
type τ , another o-set of type τ , a linked o-set similar to role linking or an intersection of
k o-sets. These rules are as follows:
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Value assignment: This means that v is a member of the o-set A.o. Note that v could
be an expression that evaluates to a value of type τ .
A.o (p1 , ..., pn ) ← v

(5.9)

o-set assignment: This just adds the contents of one o-set to another.
A.o (p1 , ..., pn ) ← B.o1 (v1 , ..., vm )

(5.10)

Linked o-set: Here the o-set o contains any logical object that is defined by any
principal defining o1 in A’s role r1 .
A.o (p1 , ..., pn ) ← A.r1 (t1 , ..., tl ) .o1 (v1 , ..., vm )

(5.11)

Intersection of o-sets: Here we just define the intersection of k o-sets
A.o (p1 , ..., pn ) ← B1 .o1 (v1 , ..., vm1 ) ∩ ... ∩ Bk .o1 (v1 , ..., vmk )

(5.12)

Consider the example given in [14].

Example 5.1

Alpha allows the manager of the owner of a file to access that file:

Alpha.read (?F ) ← Alpha.manager (?E : Alpha.owner (?F ))
Here ?E is assigned the output of Alpha.owner (?F ) for every file ?F .

5.1.1 RT T Manifold Roles
Manifold roles extends the notion of a role to include an entity collection. Since a role
is a set of principals or entities, and this is extended to contain not only entities but
collections of entities or sets of entities this allows a set of sets. To have a consistent
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semantics, Manifold roles are used in the case of roles in RTi by replacing single entities
with a set containing just that one entity. Two new types of credentials are introduced in
RT T
Manifold dot products:
A.R ← B1 .R1 ¯ ... ¯ Bk .Rk

(5.13)

A.R ⊇ {s1 ∪ ... ∪ sk |si ∈ members (Bi .Ri ) , 1 ≤ i ≤ k}

(5.14)

This syntax means

Manifold cross products:
A.R ← B1 .R1 ⊗ ... ⊗ Bk .Rk

(5.15)

This syntax means
A.R ⊇ {s1 ∪ ... ∪ sk | (si ∈ members (Bi .Ri ) ∧ si ∩ sj = ∅) , 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ k}
(5.16)
Consider the following example.

Example 5.2

Company 1 (C1) defines a person to be on a committee if one manager

authorizes it and two different supervisors say so. This can be represented using the
following credentials: If
members (C1.Managers) ⊇ {{Miller} , {P aine}}
members (C1.Supervisors) ⊇ {{OldF ather} , {Hamilton} , {F erguson}}
and
C1.T emp1 ← C1.Supervisors ⊗ C1.Supervisors
C1.T emp2 ← C1.Managers ¯ C1.T emp1
C1.Committee ← C1.T emp2.Committee
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Then we have

And if

members (C1.T emp1) ⊇ {{Miller, Hamilton} , {Miller, F erguson} ,
{Hamilton, F erguson}}
members (C1.T emp2) ⊇ {{Miller, Hamilton} , {Miller, F erguson} ,
{Miller, Hamilton, F erguson} ,
{Miller, Hamilton, P aine} ,
{Miller, F erguson, P aine} ,
{Hamilton, F erguson, P aine}}
Miller.Committee
Miller.Committee
Hamilton.Committee
Hamilton.Committee
Hamilton.Committee
F erguson.Committee
F erguson.Committee
P aine.Committee

← Miller
← Hamilton
← Hamilton
← F erguson
← P aine
← F erguson
← P aine
← P aine

Then one can conclude that
members (C1.Committee) ⊇ {Hamilton, P aine}
but one cannot conclude
members (C1.Committee) ⊇ {Miller}
or
members (C1.Committee) ⊇ {F erguson}

5.1.1 RT D Role Activations
Role activations allow authorization delegation from user-to-session and process-toprocess. There must be an original principal-to-session delegation. These delegations
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are different in that an authorization is being delegated for the lifetime of the session
or process and the rights of a role are being passed to a session or process instead of
a principal being put in a role. This is like a power of attorney contract for a limited
amount of time or for performing a specific duty.
Delegation Credential: This rule means that B2 is acting for D as A.R if B1 is acting
for D as A.R.
as A.R
−−−−−→ B2
B1 D

(5.17)

The process of acting for ends (or starts) with
as A.R
−−−−−→ B1
DD

(5.18)

where we have B1 is acting for D as A.R if D is in the role A.R.
Another form is when you delegate every activation in which you are acting for D
as all
−−−−→ B2
B1 D

(5.19)

This rule means that if B1 is acting for D it is activating those roles, thus B2 is also acting
for D in any role.
The last form activates all.
−
→ B2
B1 all

(5.20)

This means that B1 is activating every delegation. So if B1 is acting, so is B2 .
Besides delegating role activations, RT D also has a syntax for requesting a role
activation.
−−−−−−−→ req
B activation

(5.21)

where activation is any one of the activations above and req is a dummy variable having
a RequestID.
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5.2 Translations
The Trust Management language allows other types besides integers and uses these types
only in safe ways.
• Integers
• Closed enumeration types where the members are statically declared.
• Open enumeration types where the members are not statically declared.
• Floats which are really arbitrary precision rational numbers.
Because Constraint Datalog over addition constraints is a complete language it is
enough to translate the delegations above into Constraint Datalog. It is possible to
translate everything into integers and write every delegation and activation in terms of
integers. In fact every translation is straight forward with the exception of manifold roles.
To handle manifold roles we define the principal being assigned in the translations
below to be a setid, and an additional relation set (setid, principal) which maps
setid’s to the principals or other values contained in the set. Thus we translate relations
containing sets to nested relations. This translation works well for all but the role product
operators as we will see.

5.2.1 Simple member

From : A.r (h1 , ..., hn ) ← D
To : r (A, D, x1 , ..., xk ) : − ψ
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5.2.2 Simple containment

From : A.r (h1 , ..., hn ) ← B.r1 (s1 , ..., sm )
To : r (A, y, x1 , ..., xk ) : − r1 (B, y, x1,1 , ..., x1,k1 ) , ψ

5.2.3 Linking containment

From : A.r (h1 , ..., hn ) ← A.r1 (s1,1 , ..., s1,m1 ) .r2 (s2,1 , ..., s2,m2 )
To : r (A, y, x1 , ..., xk ) : − r1 (A, z, x1,1 , ..., x1,k1 ) , set(z, z 0 ), r2 (z 0 , y, x2,1 , ..., x2,k2 ) , ψ

5.2.4 Intersection containment

From : A.r (h1 , ..., hn ) ← A1 .r1 (s1,1 , ..., s1,m1 ) ∩ ... ∩ Al .rl (sl,1 , ..., sl,ml )
To : r (A, y, x1 , ..., xk ) : − r1 (A1 , y, x1,1 , ..., x1,k1 ) , ..., rl (Al , y, xl,1 , ..., xl,kl ) , ψ

5.2.5 Simple delegation

From : A.r (h1 , ..., hn ) ⇐ B : C.r2 (s1 , ..., sm )
To : r (A, y, x1 , ..., xk ) : − r1 (B, y, x1,1 , ..., x1,k1 ) , r2 (C, y, x2,1 , ..., x2,k2 ) , ψ

5.2.6 Linking delegation

From : A.r ⇐ A.r1 : C.r2
To : r (A, y, x1 , ..., xk ) : − r1 (B, y, x1,1 , ..., x1,k1 ) , r2 (C, y, x2,1 , ..., x2,k2 ) , ψ
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Example 5.3

Consider the scenario in Figure 5.1. SciOrg gets funding from NSF

so it allows NSF to have simple delegation of the SciOrgDB role to NSF. NSF allows
research from UNL to access data if they are also a member of the NSF_Fellow role.
Nebraska Department of Agriculture researchers also do research at UNL and are
members of the researcher role.

Role: DBAdmin

Role: DBUser

Role: Researcher

National Science
Foundation (NSF)
Type: Principal

SciOrg
Type: Principal

NSF.SciOrgDB Å NSF.Researcher
NFS.SciOrgDB Å NSF.DBAdmin.SciDataAdmin

SciOrg.SciOrgDB Í NSF
SciOrg.DBUser Å Manager

NSF.Researcher Í UNL.Researcher : UNL.NSF_Fellow

Role: Researcher

UNL
Type: Principal

Role: Employee

NE Department of
Agriculture (NDA)
Type: Principal

UNL.Researcher Å NDA.Employee (intersect) NDA.Researcher

Figure 5.1: Role-based Trust Management Example

The statements in Figure 5.1 can be extended to include parameters as shown in
Figure 5.2.
We categorize these rules in Figure 5.2 respectively as Simple Member, Simple
Containment, Linking Containment, Intersection Containment, Simple Delegation and

42
SciOrg. DBUser  Managerhost  descendant“sciorg.org”
NSF. SciOrgDB  NFS.Researcher
NSF. SciOrgDB  NSF.DBAdmin. SciDataAdmintime  1700.. 2400
UNL. Researcher  NDA.Employee  NDA. Researcher
SciOrg. DBUser  NSF
NSF. Researcher  UNL.Reasearcher : UNL. NSF_Fellowlevel  “Ph.D”

Figure 5.2: SciOrg RT1C rules
Linking Delegation. Using the rules above we translate these RT1C rules to Constraint
Datalog in Figure 5.3.
DBUserC, D,host : 

C  SciOrg, D  Manager,
host  sciorg. org.

SciOrgDBC, D,time : 

C  “SciOrg”, E  “NSF”,SciOrgDBE, D.

SciOrgDBC, D,time : 

C  “NFS”, E  “NFS”,ResearcherE, D.

SciOrgDBC, D,time : 

C  “NSF”, E  “NSF”,DBAdminE, F,
SciDataAdminF, D,time  1700, time  2400.

ResearcherC, D,level :  C  “NSF”, E  “UNL”,ResearcherE, D,
NSF_FellowE, D,level  “Ph. D”.
ResearcherC, D,level :  C  “UNL”, E  “NDA”,EmployeeE, D,
ResearcherE, D.

Figure 5.3: SciOrg Constraint Datalog Rules

5.2.1 O-set delegation
These translations are the same as the translations of the delegations above, except that
the roles become o-sets.
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5.2.2 Manifold roles
RT T modifies the notion of elements of a role from being principals to sets of principals.
We introduce a predicate set (id, value) that uniquely identifies the values in any set.
This does not change the representation of delegation in Datalog for any of the above
rules. However, it is necessary for us to define the role product operators ¯ and ⊗.
From : A.R ← B1 .R1 ¯ ... ¯ Bk .Rk
isMember(z, R, A) : − role(A, R),
To:
isMember(z1 , R1 , B1 ), role(B1 , R1 ),
...
isMember(zk , Rk , Bk ), role(B1 , R1 ),
setk (z, z1 , ..., zk )
Where setk is a new predicate symbol defined as follows.

Definition 5.4

[14] setk takes k + 1 entity collections as arguments and

setk (s, s1 , ..., sk ) is true if and only if s = s1 ∪ ... ∪ sk . When si is an entity it is treated
as a single-element set
From : A.R ← B1 .R1 ⊗ ... ⊗ Bk .Rk
isMember(z, R, A) role(A, R),
To:
isMember(z1 , R1 , B1 ), role(B1 , R1 )
...
isMember(zk , Rk , Bk ), role(Bk , Rk )
nisetk (z, z1 , ..., zk )
Where nisetk is a new predicate symbol defined as follows.

Definition 5.5

[14] nisetk takes k + 1 entity collections as arguments and

nisetk (s, s1 , ..., sk ) is true if and only if s = s1 ∪ ... ∪ sk and for any 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k and
i 6= j, si ∩ sj = ∅. When si is an entity it is treated as a single-element set
We could easily allow enumeration types and define these predicate symbols. It is

44
R1(A,s) :- A=1, s=2.
R1(A,s) :- A=1, s=5.
R2(A,s) :- A=1, s=2.
R2(A,s) :- A=1, s=3.
R2(A,s) :- A=1, s=4.
R(id,A,s) :- R1(A,s), id=1.
R(id,A,s) :- R2(A,s), id=2.
set(i,v) :- i=2, v=2.
set(i,v) :- i=3, v=3.
set(i,v) :- i=4, v=4.
set(i,v) :- i=5, v=5.
UnionListA(x) :- x=1.
UnionListA(x) :- x=2.

uniqueID(x,y,z) :- x=2,y=3,z=1.
uniqueID(x,y,z) :- x=2,y=4,z=2.
uniqueID(x,y,z) :- x=2,y=5,z=3.
uniqueID(x,y,z) :- x=3,y=4,z=4.
uniqueID(x,y,z) :- x=3,y=5,z=5.
uniqueID(x,y,z) :- x=4,y=5,z=6.
uniqueID(x,y,z) :- x=3,y=2,z=1.
uniqueID(x,y,z) :- x=4,y=2,z=2.
uniqueID(x,y,z) :- x=5,y=2,z=3.
uniqueID(x,y,z) :- x=4,y=3,z=4.
uniqueID(x,y,z) :- x=5,y=3,z=5.
uniqueID(x,y,z) :- x=5,y=4,z=6.
uniqueID(x,y,z) :- x=2,y=2,z=7.

setA(id,e) :- UnionListA(x), UnionListA(y), x-y<0, R(x,A,s1), R(y,A,s2),
set(s1,e), uniqueID(s1,s2,id).
setA(id,e) :- UnionListA(x), UnionListA(y), y-x>0, R(x,A,s1), R(y,A,s2),
set(s2,e), uniqueID(s2,s1,id).

Table 5.1: Role Dot Product
possible to define the product operators using only integer constraints. Consider the
following example for the ¯ product.
Example 5.6

Consider R1 and R2 to be manifold roles containing singleton set

elements as follows:
R1 = {{2} , {5}}
R2 = {{2} , {3} , {4}}
Notice that the set names coincide with the element, but that does not need to be the case.
The Constraint Datalog program in Table 5.1 calculates R1 ¯ R2. The Unique ID’s are
required because we are creating new set elements to include in a role. The output shown
in Table 5.2 gives the results of the program.

This program requires 2n tuples for unique identifiers. It also requires 2k−1 different
rules like the last two rules in Table 5.1, because we must account for the different

45
setA(id, e) :- id = 1, e = 2.
setA(id, e) :- id = 1, e = 3.
setA(id, e) :- id = 2, e = 2.
setA(id, e) :- id = 2, e = 4.
setA(id, e) :- id = 3, e = 5.
setA(id, e) :- id = 3, e = 2.
setA(id, e) :- id = 5, e = 5.
setA(id, e) :- id = 5, e = 3.
setA(id, e) :- id = 6, e = 5.
setA(id, e) :- id = 6, e = 4.
setA(id, e) :- id = 7, e = 2.

Table 5.2: Role Dot Product Results
orderings possible. It may be possible to lower this last restriction with some kind of
ordering.

5.2.1 Role Activations
This is a single activation by B1 that says B2 is acting for D as A.R where R is a
specified role.
as A.R
−−−−−→ B2
From: B1 D
To:
f orRole (B2 , D, A, R) : − f orRole (B1 , D, R) , role (A, R) .

This role encompassing activation by B1 says that B2 is acting for D in any role that
B1 is acting for where r is a role variable.
as A.R
−−−−−−→ B2
From: B1 all
To:
f orRole (B2 , D, A, r) : − forRole (B1 , D, r) , role (A, r) .

This all encompassing activation by B1 says that if B1 is acting for any entity in any
role, B2 also is activated for these roles. Here a and r are both variables.
−
→ B2
From: B1 all
To:
forRole (B2 , D, a, r) : − f orRole (B1 , a, r) , role (a, r) .

A request for an activation is similar.
as all
−−−−→ req
From: B1 D
To:
f orRole (ReqID, D, a, r) : − forRole (B1 , D, a, r) , role (a, r) .
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Statement Type

RT Language
2+n
2+n+m
3 + n + m1 +m2

simple member
simple containment
linking containment

Pl

Constraint Datalog
3+k
3 + k 1 +k2
7 + k + k 1 +k 2
Pl

intersection
containment
simple delegation

l + 1+

3 + n + m1 +m2

7 + k + k 1 +k 2

linking delegation

3 + n + m1 +m2

7 + k + k 1 +k 2

o-set delegation
manifold roles

same as above

same as above

activations

k

4 (k + 1)

1 sl,ml

2 (l + 1) +

P

i

1

xl,kl

|ni | +4 (k + 1)

k+1

Explanation
n≈k
n + m ≈ k 1 +k 2
n + m1 +m2
≈ k + k 1 +k 2
Pl
Pl
1 sl,ml ≈
1 xl,kl
n + m1 +m2
≈ k + k 1 +k 2
n + m1 +m2
≈ k + k 1 +k 2

same as above
ni is the number of
enumeration elements
nearly identical

Table 5.3: Number of Variables Required
The notation for role activations differentiates it from delegations. There is no
difference in the Datalog rules that they are translated to, except the relation name
forRole and the dynamic nature of activations.

5.3 Comparing the Complexity
Here we are comparing the complexity of the RT family of languages with the rules
as they are translated into Constraint Datalog. In analyzing this we use two different
metrics to compare the language to the semantics. The first metric compares the number
of variables required in Constraint Datalog to the number of variables in RT. The second
metric compares the number of rules required in Constraint Datalog to the number
of rules in RT. Another way to describe this is to say that we compare the size of the
program needed to execute the statements using the logic rules found in [14] with the
different types available and using Constraint Datalog over integer addition constraints
without additional types.
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In Table 5.3 all the statements have similar numbers of variables except the manifold
roles. This occurs because in the role product operators ¯ and ⊗, we have to manipulate
the actual elements in the set instead of just the set IDs. Since we do not have
enumeration (set) elements, the number of variables in this case is much greater for
Constraint Datalog. Since the rules are designed with logic in mind, it is not surprising
that there is little difference between the number of variables in the rule and the number
of variables needed to implement the rule in Constraint Datalog.
When comparing the number of Constraint Datalog rules needed for each RT rule, we
again see a 1-to-1 correspondence except in manifold role product operations. Because
we are implementing sets of sets using Datalog with addition constraints only, we have to
build the operators without using set notation. Although the program in Table 5.1 runs, it
clearly could be written in one rule if MLPQ [19] had enumeration types.
We conclude that the policies in RT have a coinciding number of variables and rules
except for separation-of-duty policies.
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Chapter 6: Expressiveness using Addition
Constraints in Security
It does not take much imagination to find several security situations that may use addition
constraints or some type of Diophantine equation constraint to authorize some request.
In general, if we have one or more rating organizations that assign an integer level of
confidence to an individual, then it may be useful for a different organization to calculate
an acceptable confidence level based on other organizations’ rating. It may be especially
useful if the rating system in use is scaled differently than the rating system of a reference
organization.
As another example, we note that Trust Management can extend beyond security to
include trust as it relates to E-mail from individuals. We might also extend it to gathering
and analyzing different ratings form E-mail servers.
Consider the example of a threshold policy. Suppose an FBI employee also has an
NSA clearance. The CIA may wish to provide individuals with both FBI and NSA
clearances a level of security based on the following credential

CIA (id, ll ) : − F BI (id, l1 ) , NSA (id, l2 ) ,
ll ≤ 2l13+l2 < lu , lu − ll = 1,
V isitLevel (ll , lu ) , ll < 7.

Clearly we can write the first constraint as

3ll ≤ 2l1 + l2 < 3lu
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which is expressed as an addition constraint in Constraint Datalog. Using the difference
and multiplication rules from Table 4.1, we get the following valid rule:
CIA (ID, ll ) : − F BI (id, l1 ) , NSA (id, l2 ) ,
3ll − 2l1 + l2 ≤ 0,
2l1 + l2 − 3lu < 0,
lu − ll = 1,
V isitLevel (ll , lu ) .
Threshold policies are one of the types of policies that other Trust Management
languages have difficulty expressing. The concept of using an approximately complete,
safe language is very important in that respect. Now it is possible to express any type of
policy including all types of threshold polices if we base a Trust Management language
on Datalog with addition constraints and approximation.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions
We reviewed the concepts of Trust Management, gave a brief overview of several Trust
Management systems and described the environment and its requirements. We proposed
a Turing-complete language as a solution to the problem of continually adding features
to existing languages. The halting problem associated with complete languages prevents
this possibility unless a we can overcome it. Approximation in Constraint Datalog over
addition constraints solves this problem. The theory was given and a detailed fractal
example demonstrated the approximation theory. We then showed that Diophantine
equations are expressively equivalent to Turing Machines and cited Matiyasevich’s
work in proving this. Based on approximation and Diophantine equations being
Turing-complete, we proposed that Constraint Datalog over addition constraints be used
as an approximately complete, safe language. This was shown by demonstrating that
any Diophantine equation can be expressed by using Constraint Datalog over addition
constraints. We gave a detailed look at translating the Role-based Trust Management
family of languages into Constraint Datalog and showed that the rules in RT have similar
complexity to the rules in Constraint Datalog. Finally, additional reasons for using
Constraint Datalog with addition constraints was given along with an example of a
threshold policy.
Finally, we mention some directions for future work. First, adding the ability to
update a tuple inside the body of a rule would simplify many operations, but would need
a theoretical basis in safety. Second, different kinds of policy constructs, such as mutual
exclusion of roles, need to have semantics defined in Constraint Datalog.
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